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THE ANTINOMY OF THE VARIABLE: A TARSKIAN RESOLUTION* 
The theory of quantification and variable binding developed by Tarski is a fixed 
point for many debates in metaphysics, formal semantics, and philosophy of 
logic. However, recent critics—most forcefully, Kit Fine1—have posed an 
intriguing set of challenges to Tarski’s account, which re-expose long sublimated 
anxieties about the variable from the infancy of analytic philosophy.  
 
The problem is a version of a puzzle confronted by Russell, which Fine dubs the 
“antimony of the variable”. This paradox arises from seemingly contradictory 
things that we wish to say about the variable. On the one hand, there are strong 
reasons to deny that ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous, since they make different 
contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence. Consider, for instance, 
the sentence ‘∃𝑥∃𝑦 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦’. One cannot replace the second occurrence of ‘x’ with 
‘y’ (yielding ‘∃𝑥∃𝑦 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦’) without change of meaning. On the other hand, there is 
a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous, 
since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ always 
agree in meaning. For instance, ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥’ and ‘∀𝑦 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦’ are synonymous in the 
strongest possible sense. As Fine says, they are mere “notational variants”. We 
suggest that it is best to construe this very strong synonymy as an identity in 
structured meanings: the sentences and their corresponding parts are 
synonymous all the way down. This suggests that the variables occurring in 
corresponding positions in these formulas are also synonymous.  
 
One of the innovations of Tarski’s semantics is that a variable refers to or 
designates an object only relative to a sequence.2 One might hope that this goes 
some way towards resolving the antinomy, since Tarski need not assign any sort 
                                                        
* The paper has benefited as a result of comments from Josh Dever, Dilip Ninan, Landon Rabern, 
Anders Schoubye, and an anonymous referee at this JOURNAL. Previous versions of this paper 
received useful input from audiences at the Early Analytic Group at the University of Stirling, the 
Institute of Philosophy in London, the Edinburgh Philosophy of Language Group, and the Formal 
Metaphysics Workshop at the University of St Andrews. Bryan Pickel acknowledges the help of 
partial funds from projects CSD2009–00056 and FFI2012-37658 (Spanish Government). 
1 Kit Fine, “The role of variables”, this JOURNAL, C,  12 (December 2003): 605-631; Kit Fine, 
Semantic Relationism. (Blackwell Publishing, 2007). 
2 Alfred Tarski, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den Formalisierten Sprachen”, Studia Philosophica, I 
(1935): 261–405, republished in translation (by J.H. Woodger) as “The concept of truth in 
formalized languages” in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956): 
152–278. 
 2 
of referent to the variable. But this is not enough, since the antinomy concerns 
whether two variables are synonymous. As we formulate the antinomy, it 
concerns the variable’s contribution to the structured meaning of a sentence that 
contains it. Even on Tarski’s sequence-relative semantics, ‘x’ and ‘y’ may 
designate different individuals even relative to the same sequence.  This suggests 
that their meanings are different. But this leaves Tarski unable to account for the 
felt sameness of meaning between distinct but corresponding variables in 
alphabetic variants. 
 
These challenges would overturn seemingly settled doctrines about the 
relationship between language and the world. A dramatic reconceptualization of 
the role of variables in mathematical practice, in natural language semantics, and 
even in first-order logic would be called for. Fine suggests “semantic relationism”, 
a radical departure from standard compositional semantics.  
 
However, Tarski’s semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the 
antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics. In a neglected 
passage, Tarski worried about how to determine the value of a variable relative 
to a sequence. He suggests that, in a given sentence, the first variable should be 
associated with the first position, the second variable with the second position, 
and so on. Using a bit of dynamic semantics, we develop this suggestion into a 
rigorous procedure—which we call dynamic indexing—associating each variable 
with a position in a sequence. The underlying idea is that the semantic 
contribution of a variable maps a context to a position in a sequence. On the 
semantics we offer, ‘x’ and ‘y’ will be associated with distinct functions from 
contexts into positions in sequences. Nonetheless, if ‘x’ and ‘y’ occur in 
corresponding positions in sentences that are alphabetic variants, then (in 
context) they will be correlated with the same position in a sequence. Thus, we 
offer a sense in which ‘x’ and ‘y’ have the same semantic role and a sense in 
which they don’t, thereby resolving the antinomy. 
 
I. THE ANTINOMY OF THE VARIABLE 
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Variables are central to the notation of mathematics and science. Some 
mathematical and scientific claims are framed using “free” variables. A 
mathematician might express the claim that an operator such as ‘+’ is 
commutative using the “open” formula ‘𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑦 + 𝑥’. Free variables are of 
limited use in expressing generality, however, since one cannot express 
embedded general claims such as negated universal or multiply quantified 
statements.  
 
For instance, sentence (1) could in principle be rewritten using only free 
variables. Sentence (2) requires more sophisticated symbolism. 
 
(1) Every number is less than or equal to itself.  
(2) Every number is less than or equal to some number.  
 
For this reason, both sentence (1) and (at least one reading of) sentence (2) are 
regimented using “bound” variables, which fall under the scope of quantifiers 
such as ‘for every’ (‘∀’) and ‘for some’ (‘∃’). 
 
(1*) ∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥    
(2*) ∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 
 
Writing quantified sentences using variables resolves ambiguities and facilitates 
inference because it wears its compositional structure on its sleeve. In particular, 
the meaning of the complex expression in this notation is determined by the 
meanings of its syntactic constituents and their order of combination. That is, 
meaning is compositional.  Compositionality helps explain why speakers can 
grasp the infinitely many sentences of a language. It also constrains the choice of 
semantic theories, making them more susceptible to empirical disconfirmation. 
 
In contrast to the quantified sentences of formal languages, semanticists 
commonly derive the semantic features of a quantified sentence from natural 
language—such as (1)—by first regimenting it. Often, they posit a “deeper” level 
of representation, which captures the “logical form”. For example, contemporary 
 4 
linguists provide a syntactic story whereby the quantifier “moves” out front and 
leaves behind a “trace”. The trace is treated as a bound variable.3 In this way, the 
syntactic structure—e.g. of (1*)—more directly tracks its semantic evaluation. 
But what is the syntactic structure of sentences (1*) and (2*)? The standard 
answer since Tarski is as follows. In constructing (1*), one starts with the 
variable ‘x’ and the two-place predicate ‘≤’ to build the “open sentence” ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑥’.4 
One then prefixes the quantifier ‘∀𝑥’ yielding ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’. Sentence (2*) is 
constructed similarly. We start with the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ and the two-place 
predicate ‘≤’ to build the open sentence ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑦’, then prefix ‘∀𝑥’ to yield ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤
𝑦’. Finally, one attaches ‘∃𝑦’ resulting in ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’. So, this standard account 
presupposes what we will call assumption (): Variables are genuine syntactic 
constituents of quantified sentences.  
 
Some approaches to the semantics of quantification dispense with assumption 
(), and reject the view that variables have an independent semantic role.5 We 
will address one of these arising from the Fregean tradition. But we will leave 
other approaches—such as combinatory logic—for future discussion. 
 
Assuming that a variable is a genuine constituent of a sentence, it must have 
some meaning or what Fine calls a “semantic role” or “linguistic function”.6  It is 
the job of semantics to describe this meaning.   
 
The antinomy of the variable concerns whether two variables, ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’, agree in 
meaning. The difficulty is—as Fine (ibid.) puts it—“we wish to say contradictory 
things about their semantic role”. The conflict arises because two variables 
                                                        
3 See Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer, Semantics in Generative Grammar, (Blackwell Publishers, 
1998), 178–200. 
4 Tarski was the first to clearly argue that open sentences belong in the same grammatical 
category as closed sentence. His argument was that the same operators—negation, conjunction, 
and so on—could attach to both open and closed sentences, see Tarski, ibid., 189-91, and Alfred 
Tarski,  Introduction to Logic, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1941), 4-5. 
5 In natural language semantics the roles of quantification and variable-binding are sometime 
separated. The latter job is done by -binders, which attach to open sentences that contain 
variables. It follows that variables are still genuine constituents of a sentence. 
6 Fine 2007, op. cit., p. 7. 
 5 
occurring in the same sentence seem to behave differently, but occurring in 
different sentences their behavior is indistinguishable.7 
 
Difference: When variables ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’ jointly occur in a single 
sentence, they have distinct meanings. 
 
Sameness: In sentences that differ in the total, proper 
substitution of ‘𝑥’ for ‘𝑦’, these variables have the 
same meanings. 
 
In what follows, we offer arguments purporting to show that two variables must 
have these conflicting features, by making explicit the underlying theoretical 
motivations for ascribing each feature to variables. 
 
I.I.  WHY ‘�’ AND ‘�’ MUST NOT AGREE IN MEANING 
The argument that ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’ have different meaning is straightforward, since 
substituting one for the other may fail to preserve meaning. Fine appeals to open 
sentences containing free variables to make the argument: 
Suppose that we have two variables, say ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’;… [W]hen we consider 
the semantic role of the variables in the same expression—such as ‘𝑥 >
 𝑦’—then it seems…clear that their semantic role is different. Indeed, it is 
essential to the linguistic function of the expression as a whole that it 
contains two distinct variables, not two occurrences of the same variable, 
and presumably this is because the roles of the distinct variables are not 
the same.8 
 
Fine’s crucial premise is that expressions differing only by the substitution of one 
occurrence of a variable for an occurrence of the other differ in meaning. In 
Fine’s example, the occurrence of ‘x’ in the open sentence ‘𝑥 >  𝑦’ cannot be 
substituted with ‘y’—yielding ‘𝑦 >  𝑦’—without change of meaning.  
 
                                                        
7 Fine 2007, op. cit., p. 9 does not rest content with this form of the paradox. He asks what it 
means for ‘x’ and ‘y’ to have different semantic roles in a context. He answers that the pairs of 
variables ‘x’, ‘y’ and ‘x’, ‘x’ make different contributions to whatever sentences contain them. Since 
Fine’s opponents don’t offer any semantic characterization of pairs of expressions, we will leave 
the antinomy as it stands. 
8 Fine 2003, op. cit., p. 606. 
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The argument implicitly appeals to the principle of compositionality, that the 
semantic features of a whole are determined by the semantic features of their 
parts and their mode of combination. In particular, if ‘x’ and ‘y’ had exactly the 
same semantic features, then, replacing the first occurrence of ‘x’ with ‘y’ in ‘𝑥 >
 𝑦’ should yield a sentence with the same meaning. But it does not. 
 
While intuitive, some may object to Fine’s appeal to the meanings of open 
sentences.  One might doubt whether one has direct access to whether the open 
sentences ‘𝑥 > 𝑦’ and ‘𝑦 > 𝑦’ agree in meaning. The case could therefore be 
strengthened if it can be established that replacing ‘x’ with ‘y’ in a closed 
sentence does not preserve meaning. This can be directly verified by considering 
the fact that ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦’ and ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥’ differ in meaning—indeed they may 
differ in truth-value, though they differ only by replacing an occurrence of ‘x’ 
with ‘y’. It follows from the principle of compositionality that the variables ‘x’ and 
‘y’ differ in meaning. 
 
I.II. WHY ‘�’ AND ‘�’ MUST AGREE IN MEANING 
Fine’s argument that ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’ must agree in meaning is elusive: 
Suppose that we have two variables, say ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’; …[W]hen we consider 
their semantic role in two distinct expressions—such as ‘𝑥 >  0’ and ‘𝑦 >
 0’, we wish to say that their semantic role is the same. Indeed, this would 
appear to be as clear a case as any of a mere “conventional” or 
“notational” difference; the difference is merely in the choice of the 
symbol and not in its linguistic function.9 
 
Undoubtedly, Fine is right that the choice between ‘𝑥 >  0’ and ‘𝑦 >  0’ is purely 
notational, and thus their “meanings” must have something in common. But Fine 
doesn’t elucidate the theoretical importance of this commonality. The claim that 
‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’ agree in meaning (in some important sense) is crucial to Fine’s whole 
project. Without it, there simply is no antinomy. So it is desirable to find some 
more robust theoretical motivation for the claim.  
 
Such a motivation can be found by appealing to a strong notion of synonymy 
recognized within the formal semantics tradition. This tradition aims at 
                                                        
9 Fine 2003, op. cit., p. 606. 
 7 
specifying the truth conditions of a sentence in terms of the compositional 
semantic values of its constituents.10 The truth conditions of a sentence will be 
specified as the set of points of evaluation (e.g. sets of possible worlds) in which 
the sentence is true. The problem is that, even within the formal semantics 
tradition, truth conditions are recognized as rather too coarse-grained to serve as 
the meanings of sentences. For instance, assuming all mathematical theorems are 
necessary, any two theorems (such as ‘there are infinitely many prime numbers’ 
and ‘two is prime’) are truth conditionally equivalent. But any view counting 
these sentences as wholly synonymous is missing something.11 
 
This problem is standardly addressed by identifying the meaning of a sentence 
not merely with its compositional semantic value, but also with the procedure by 
which the compositional semantic value was derived from the meanings of the 
sentence’s ultimate constituents. Let us call this, the sentence’s structured 
meaning. When the antinomy is construed in terms of structured meanings, it 
derives its force from the conjunction of assumption () which states that 
variables are genuine constituents of sentences which contain them with an 
additional assumption linking a sentence’s syntactic constituents to the 
constituents of its structured meaning. We call this assumption (). 
() Variables are genuine syntactic constituents of quantified and 
open sentences of the regimented language. 
() Each syntactic constituent of a sentence of a regimented language 
must correspond to a constituent of the structured meaning of that 
sentence. 
Assumption () traces back to Carnap’s strongest notion of synonymy, 
“intensional isomorphism”, which requires that the parts of synonymous 
sentences agree in meaning.12  
                                                        
10 David Lewis, “General semantics”, Synthese XXII, 1 (1970): 18–67. Richard Montague, “The 
proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English”, in Montague and Richmond Thomason 
(editor), Formal Philosophy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
11 If one thinks that mathematical theorems are contingent—for instance, because one thinks 
that the existence of mathematical entities is contingent—then the example can easily be altered 
to our purposes. See the discussion in Heim and Kratzer, op. cit., §12.4. 
12 Rudolph Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947). Carnap 
cites C. I. Lewis as a predecessor, but says that their views developed independently. See C.I. 
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For similar reasons, Stalnaker speaks of the meaning of a sentence as “the recipe 
for determining its truth-conditions as a function of the meanings of its 
components and the compositional rules”.13 As Lewis says,  
Differences in intension, we may say, give us coarse differences in 
meaning. For fine differences in meaning we must look to the analysis of a 
compound into constituents and to the intensions of the several 
constituents. … For still finer differences in meaning we must look in turn 
to the intensions of constituents of constituents, and so on. Only when we 
come to non-compound, lexical constituents can we take sameness of 
intension as a sufficient condition of synonymy.14 
 
 
In addition to providing a grip on the pre-theoretic notion of synonymy, 
structured meanings have been put to work in developing an account of the 
information value or belief content of a sentence, which can solve puzzles 
associated with propositional attitude ascriptions. Thus, Carnap (ibid., §13), 
followed by many others, argued that belief ascriptions are neither extensional 
nor intensional since they do not even permit the substitution of intensionally 
equivalent sentences. Although ‘there are infinitely many primes’ has the same 
intension as ‘2+2=4’, the belief ascriptions ‘Sam believes that there are infinitely 
many primes’ and ‘Sam believes that 2+2=4’ may differ in truth-value.  
 
Fine’s claim that ‘x’ and ‘y’ agree in meaning can be bolstered by framing it in 
terms of structured meanings. One corollary of assumption () is that if two 
sentences are synonymous in the relevant sense, then they must have 
corresponding constituents which agree in meaning. That is, if 𝜙 and 𝜓 are 
synonymous (i.e. have the same structured meaning), then each component 𝛼 of 
𝜙 must agree in meaning—in the relevant sense—with its counterpart 𝛽 of 𝜓. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Lewis, “The Modes of Meaning”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IV, 2, (1943): 236-
250. 
13 Robert Stalnaker, “Impossibilities”, p. 65, in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti 
Metaphysical Essays, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2003): 55-68. 
14 Lewis, ibid., p. 31. 
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The problem now is that formulae that result from the total, proper substitution 
of one variable ‘x’ for another ‘y’ are synonymous in the strongest sense.15 
Consider two regimentations of sentence (1). We regimented this sentence as 
‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥’, but ‘∀𝑦 𝑦 ≤  𝑦’ is an equally good regimentation of (1). Indeed, one 
would read both of these aloud as ‘every number is less than or equal to itself’. 
The fact that alphabetic variants such as ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ and ‘∀𝑦 𝑦 ≤  𝑦’ regiment the 
same natural language sentence suggests that they are synonymous.16  
 
Some semanticists such as Pauline Jacobson have been so gripped by the 
synonymy of alphabetic variants, that they have abandoned the use of variables 
in natural language semantics as somehow a “cheat”:  
If the variable names such as 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 (or, 1 and 2) are actual model-
theoretic objects, then they are of course distinct objects. And yet, when 
they find themselves in forms which are alphabetic variants, they never 
make a different semantic contribution… In other words, there is an 
obvious sense in which 𝑥1  and 𝑥2  really are not different semantic 
objects—unlike other distinct model-theoretic objects.17 
 
To avoid this antinomy, Jacobson herself offers a radical semantic proposal for 
avoiding variables in her semantics. 18 
 
                                                        
15 Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1956), p. 40 fn. 96 says: “…[an expression] which contains a particular variable as a bound 
variable is unaltered in meaning by alphabetic change of the variable, at all of its bound 
occurrences, to a new variable (not previously occurring) which has the same range.” See Donald 
Kalish and Richard Montague, Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning, (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, Inc., 1964), Chapter 7 for an explicit definition of uniform substitution and alphabetic 
variants.  
16 Related arguments occur in Kalish and Montague, ibid., p. 165. If, like Quine one thinks that 
regimentation need not preserve meaning, then one will be inclined to reject this argument (W.V. 
Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960). See also, e.g. Church, ibid., p. 20 and Lewis, 
op. cit., p. 45-46. 
17 Pauline Jacobson, “Towards a variable-free semantics”, Linguistics and Philosophy, XXII, 2 
(1999): 117–185, p. 127. 
18 Related skepticism about variables has also led logicians such as Haskell Curry and Robert 
Feys, Combinatory Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1958/1968) to 
develop alternative variable-free systems. For a different approach see the notation developed in 
N.G. De Bruijn, “Lambda calculus notation with nameless dummies, a tool for automatic formula 
manipulation, with application to the Church-Rosser theorem,” Indagationes Mathematicae 
(Proceedings), LXXV, 5 (1972): 381–392. Simply getting rid of variables in the syntax doesn’t 
automatically get one off the hook with respect to the general problems concerning the 
structured meaning of quantified sentences. Given that such systems trade variables in the 
syntax for an array of combinators in the syntax one might worry that analogous problems will 
re-emerge.  
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Another manifestation of this synonymy arises because alphabetic variants seem 
to express exactly the same belief content. This is reflected in the fact that 
alphabetic variants are intersubstitutable even in propositional attitude 
reports.19  Consider sentence (3). 
 
(3) John believes that every number is less than or equal to itself.  
 
(3) is equally well regimented by ‘John believes that ∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ and ‘John 
believes that ∀𝑦 𝑦 ≤  𝑦’. But, if so, then the structured content expressed by the 
regimentations of the embedded sentences in context must agree in meaning. 
Thus, sentences differing only by the total, proper substitution of variables look 
synonymous in the strongest possible sense. They are mere notational variants, 
if any sentences are at all.20 Thus, their corresponding parts must agree in 
meaning: ‘x’ and ‘y’ must agree in meaning. 
 
I.III.  THE CHALLENGE OF THE ANTINOMY 
We have uncovered that ‘x’ and ‘y’ must—in some sense—agree in meaning, but 
also that they must—in some sense—disagree in meaning. Both Carnap (ibid., 
58-59) and Lewis (ibid., 45-46) recognized this tension. They wanted to 
guarantee that alphabetic variants have the same structured meanings. Yet, on 
their explicit semantics, distinct variables have distinct semantic values due to 
the constraints of compositionality, giving rise to what Lewis called a “spurious 
ambiguity” between alphabetic variants such as ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥’ and ‘∀𝑦 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦’.  
                                                        
19 The total, proper substitution of bound variables preserves sense even on Church’s Alternative 
(0)—his strictest criterion of synonymy, which is meant to model attitude ascriptions. See Alonzo 
Church, “A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation”, in Paul Henle, Structure, Method, 
and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951): 3-24. See 
also page 557 of David Kaplan, “Demonstratives”, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds), 
Themes from Kaplan, (Oxford University Press, 1989): 481–563. 
20 According to the account in Max Cresswell, Structured Meanings, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1985), a sentence 𝜙 of arbitrary complexity can be embedded in the that-clause of a belief report. 
The ‘that’ operator is polysemous and can operate either on 𝜙 or on the separate parts of 𝜙 taken 
in sequence. In the latter case, the object of belief will be the structured meaning of 𝜙, which is 
identified with the ordered n-tuple of the intensions of 𝜙’s constituents. Cresswell  (ibid, p. 101) 
does not actually specify intensions for variables, but only intensions relative to an assignment. 
As a result, his procedure either fails to deliver structured meanings for ‘∃𝜆𝑥𝐹𝑥’ and ‘∃𝜆𝑦𝐹𝑦’ or—
if the semantics for variables is naturally extended to provide them intensions—will assign these 
sentences different structured meanings, delivering the unwelcome result that they may embed 
differently under belief ascription.  
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Both Carnap and Lewis introduced artificial, ad hoc maneuvers to relieve this 
tension and thereby identify the structured meanings of alphabetic variants, 
even though the corresponding constituents had different semantic values. This 
type of ad hoc trick undermines the motivation for appealing to structured 
meanings in the first place.  
 
Other proponents of structured contents have been at pains to avoid the 
antinomy. The basic idea behind the structured contents approach is that a 
sentence has a content which “encodes, or is composed out of, the meanings of 
[the sentence’s] constituents.”21 One sort of solution adopted by prominent 
proponents of structured contents approaches—including both Nathan Salmon 
and Scott Soames—involves outright denying that the structured meaning of a 
quantified sentence reflects the meanings of its ultimate components, thereby 
denying assumption ().22 In particular, according to Soames and Salmon the 
structured proposition expressed by a quantified sentence such as ‘∃𝑥𝐹𝑥’ reflects 
only the meanings of the quantifier ‘∃’ and the predicate abstract, which we will 
write as ‘?̂?𝐹𝑥’. If we use brackets ‘[…]’ to denote the contribution an expression 
makes to the structured meaning of a sentence that contains it, then we could 
display the structured meaning of  ‘∃𝑥𝐹𝑥’ as follows: 
 
 
The semantic contribution of the predicate abstract ‘?̂?𝐹𝑥’ is not broken down any 
further. This has the result that the sentence expresses the same structured 
meaning as its alphabetic variants such as ‘∃𝑦𝐹𝑦’: 
 
 
                                                        
21 Scott Soames, Philosophy of Language, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 112. 
22 See Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle, (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing, 1986), pp. 145-6, theses 
27 and 28; and Scott Soames, “Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content”, p. 
224, thesis 28d in Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, Propositions and Attitudes, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
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As a result, this approach might be used to vindicate a broadly Tarskian 
semantics.  
 
Nonetheless, one might offer three interrelated complaints. First, the approach 
requires one to intensionalize the contribution of the predicate abstracts so that 
they reflect the semantic values of some, but not all, of their constituent 
expressions.23  This intensionality will be necessary to distinguish the structured 
content of ‘∃𝑥𝐹𝑥’ from that of, e.g., ‘∃𝑥(𝐹𝑥 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑥)’.  
 
This leads to the second complaint. Namely, the approach undermines some of 
the original motivations for structured contents. The structured content of, say, 
‘ ∃𝑥 𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑠(𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑎, 𝑥) ’ will not contain the structured content of 
‘Desdemona’, but will encode it only in an indirect way.24 The third complaint is 
that the solution seemingly entails that the meanings of some constituent 
expressions are not even encoded in the structured contents of sentences that 
express them. In particular, if the meaning of ‘x’ is encoded in the structured 
content of ‘∃𝑥𝐹𝑥’ and the meaning of ‘y’ is encoded in the meaning of ‘∃𝑦𝐹𝑦’, then 
the meanings of ‘x’ and of ‘y’ would need to be the same. But it is hard to see how 
this is compatible with the fact that the meaning of ‘x’ differs from the meaning of 
‘y’ in ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑦 ≤  𝑥’. If we take the encoding talk seriously, then the antinomy 
seems to recur at the level of what is encoded rather than contained in the 
structured content of a sentence. 
 
More recently, Jeff King’s account of structured contents has attempted to do 
justice to the idea that all of the meaningful syntactic constituents of a sentence 
are encoded in the structured contents they express. As a result, he has oscillated 
in trying to adequately capture the distinct contributions of distinct variables in 
a sentence and at the same time ensure that alphabetic variants have the same 
                                                        
23 Fine 2007, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
24  An advocate of structured propositions might worry that this opens the door to a 
generalization, which accounts for belief content and synonymy in terms of hyperintensional, but 
unstructured meanings as in Church 1951, op. cit., or George Bealer, Quality and Concept, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982). 
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structured contents.  This oscillation perfectly reveals the tensions created by 
the antinomy of the variable. 
 
In his early work, King suggested that distinct variables must make distinct 
contributions to the structured contents of sentences that contain them.25 On his 
official implementation, the variables contribute themselves to the structured 
meanings, though King allows that the variables may be replaced by suitable 
proxy objects “so long as each variable contributes a different one”.26 This 
semantics has the result that alphabetic variants, since they may contain distinct 
variables, express different structured contents.27  
 
In a recent book, King abandons the view that variables contribute anything at all 
to the structured contents of sentences that contain them.28 Each variable 
contributes a mere gap or an “empty argument position”. But this makes it 
difficult to see how ‘ ∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑦 ≤  𝑦’  and ‘ ∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑦 ≤  𝑥’  can have different 
structured meanings. In particular, the semantic values of the simple 
constituents of these sentences make the same contributions to their structured 
meanings.29    
 
On our way of viewing the antinomy, it challenges us to articulate a sense in 
which alphabetic variants are synonymous—have the same structural 
                                                        
25 Jeffrey King, “Structured propositions and complex predicates”, Noûs XXIX, 4: (1995): 516-535 
(see pp. 533-4, notes 5, 20, and 22); and Jeffrey King, “Structured propositions and sentence 
structure”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, XXV (1996): 495-521 (see p. 498). 
26 King 1995, op. cit., note 22. 
27 The same problem will plague theories that appeal to “linguistic modes of presentation” such 
as the Interpreted Logic Forms of Richard Larson and Peter Ludlow, “Interpreted logical forms”, 
Synthese XCV, 3 (1993): 305-355, since “[ILFs] include complete syntactic phrase-markers, 
including diacritics (e.g., variables and indices)” (ibid., p. 349, note 29). 
28 Jeffery King, The Nature and Structure of Content, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), see 
pp. 41-2, and pp. 218-222. 
29 King’s 2007 view is best understood as embracing a kind of non-compositionality (analogous 
to that of Fine 2003, op. cit.) so that the contributions of non-terminal nodes to structured 
meanings of sentences that contain them are not determined by the contributions of their 
simpler components (see footnote 58 below). Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, “Propositions and 
compositionality”, Philosophical Perspectives XXVII (2013): 237-274, charges that King’s semantics 
is non-compositional, but in a different sense (see §3.3.2). Yli-Vakkuri argues that King’s 
semantics violates the naïve view that the structured content of a sentence in context is its 
compositional semantic value, so that substituting two sentences with the same structured 
meanings results in a sentence with the same structured meaning. We reject this naïve 
assumption and it plays no part in our argument.  
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meanings—despite the fact that the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ exhibit different semantic 
behavior, and thus have different semantic values. 
 
II. ARE THERE VARIABLES? 
Problems with variables and “the symbolism of generality” have a long history in 
analytic philosophy. For instance, in Principia, Whitehead and Russell observed 
that distinct variables make different contributions within the context of a single 
larger sentence.30 Thus, ‘x is hurt’ and ‘y is hurt’ make distinct contributions in ‘x 
is hurt and y is hurt’. On the other hand, the content of these open sentences 
express the same “propositional function”.  
Accordingly though “x is hurt” and “y is hurt” occurring in the same 
context can be distinguished, “?̂? is hurt" and “?̂? is hurt” convey no 
distinction of meaning at all.31  
 
Similarly, they hold that quantified sentences that are alphabetic variants 
express the same proposition, or structured content. 
The symbol ‘(𝑥). 𝜙𝑥’ denotes one definite proposition, and there is no 
distinction in meaning between  ‘(𝑥). 𝜙𝑥’ and  ‘(𝑦). 𝜙𝑦’ when they occur in 
the same context.32 
 
Thus, there is an important sense in which ‘x’ and ‘y’ agree in meaning, though 
not when occurring in the same context.33 
 
Despite its august roots, we suspect that many philosophers will feel little 
patience with the antinomy because it rests on assumption (), that variables are 
genuine syntactic constituents of sentences.  Indeed, there is an important 
semantic tradition originating with Frege rejecting assumption (). Frege’s 
                                                        
30 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 3 vols., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1910, 1912, 1913). Russell assumes that variables are 
“fundamental”, which seems to validate assumption (), in Bertrand Russell, “On denoting”, 
Mind, XIV, 56 (1905): 479-493, (p. 480). For further early discussion of the antinomy see Bertrand 
Russell, The Principles of Mathematics. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1903): §86-93; and 
Gottlob Frege “What is a Function?” (1904), published in translation in Peter Geach and Max 
Black, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1960): 107-116. 
31 Whitehead and Russell, ibid., p. 15. 
32 Ibid., p. 16. 
33 Wittgenstein also grappled with the antimony in the Tractatus. See his comments in 4.04—see  
especially 4.0411—regarding the picture theory and the problem of “mathematical multiplicity”. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Pears, D. and McGuinness, B. (trans.), 
(London: Routledge, 1961).  
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suspicions about variables issued from considerations resembling the antinomy 
of the variable. Frege reasons that if variables are genuine constituents of 
sentences, then two variables must have the same reference (and perhaps 
express the same sense).34   
We cannot specify what properties x has and what differing properties y 
has. If we associate anything with these letters at all, it is the same vague 
image for both of them.35 
 
Since identifying the referents of ‘x’ and ‘y’ leads to violations of the principle of 
compositionality, Frege rejects assumption (). 
 
Frege’s alternative is that bound variables are ultimately typographic parts of the 
dispersed quantifier sign. Frege has been followed by contemporary logicians 
such as Kaplan who says: 
Variables serve only to mark places for distant quantifiers to control and 
to serve as a channel for the placement of values. We need no variables. 
We could permit gaping formulas (as Frege would have had it) and use 
wiring diagrams to link the quantifier to its gaps and to channel in values. 
 
   
 
Variables are simply a way of giving the distant quantifiers wireless 
remote control over the gaps.36 
 
On this view, variables are typographic parts of the quantifier sign serving only 
to link the quantifier to the “open” spaces in predicates. 
 
II.I. THE FREGEAN SEMANTICS 
Frege thought of first-level predicates as incomplete, or as containing “gaps” 
which must be saturated by proper names. 37  Quantifiers, in turn, are 
                                                        
34 In §28 of the Grundgesetze Frege announces as a “leading principle” that every well-formed 
“name” of his language is to denote something. Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: 
Exposition of the System, Montgomery Furth (trans.), (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 
1893/1967). 
35 Frege 1904, op. cit., p. 109. 
36 David Kaplan, “Opacity”, p. 244, in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds)., The Philosophy of W. V. 
Quine (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986): 229-288. Cf. W.V. Quine, Mathematical Logic, Revised 
Edition, (Harvard University Press, 1940/1981): 69-70. 
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unsaturated, but at a higher level. Their gaps must be saturated by monadic first-
level predicates. This renders variables mere typographic parts of the quantifier 
sign. However, it would be hasty to infer from this that Fregean approaches are 
immunized against the antinomy of the variable. Russell shows in an appendix to 
The Principles of Mathematics that there is a syntactic variant of the antinomy of 
the variable that afflicts even Fregean approaches. Because of the prominence of 
Fregean approaches in the literature, we will briefly rehearse the Fregean view 
of quantification and Russell’s objection.38 
 
On Frege’s view, predicates result from “removing” occurrences of a name from a 
sentence. This is the source of their “gaps”. For instance, beginning with the 
sentence ‘7 ≤ 7’, one can remove the first, the second, or both occurrences of ‘7’ 
to yield the predicates ‘( ) ≤ 7’, ‘7 ≤ ( )’, and ‘( ) ≤ ( )’, respectively. In the third 
predicate the gaps must be seen as being filled by the same argument. 
  
Frege’s universal quantifier is a second-level predicate of monadic first-level 
predicates. It includes all occurrences of the “variable” that it binds. Updating for 
notation, he might write the universal quantifier as ‘∀𝑥 … 𝑥 …’, where ‘…’ can be 
completed only by the name of a monadic predicate.39 Quantified formulae such 
as ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤ 7’, ‘∀𝑥 7 ≤ 𝑥’, and ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥’ result from saturating the quantifier sign 
‘x…x…’ with the monadic predicates such as ‘( ) ≤ 7’, ‘7 ≤ ( )’, and ‘( ) ≤ ( )’, 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                              
37 Our discussion will focus only on the special case of predicates rather than function names in 
general.  
38 Fine 2007, op. cit., pp. 16-18 offers his own objections to the Fregean account. The first follows 
Resnik (Michael Resnik, “Frege’s proof of referentiality”, in Haaparanta, L., and J. Hintikka (eds.), 
Frege Synthesized, (Boston: Reidel Publishing Company. 1986): 177–195) in arguing that Frege’s 
semantics must be intensional, even at the level of reference. The second charges that Fregean 
theories of quantification entail that quantified sentences exhibit an unwelcome dependence on 
their instances.  
39 Frege 1893, op. cit., §8 is explicit that the mark corresponding to the bound variable cannot 
occur except when prefixed by a quantifier and that a quantifier must attach to an expression 
containing a mark corresponding to a bound variable on the standard syntax. Although Frege 
rejects assumption () and prefers to avoid talk of “variables”, he still has to typographically 
differentiate various occurrences of the quantifier sign, e.g. ‘x…x…’ versus ‘y…y…’. Rule 2 
mandates that in forming an expression of generality one must choose a new German 
letter: Frege remarks, “one German letter is in general as good as any other, with the restriction, 
however, that the distinctness of these letters can be essential" (ibid.). (In Frege's notation 
German letters adorn the quantifier sign, the concavity, and link the quantifier to the “open” 
spaces in the relevant predicates.) 
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II.II. RUSSELL’S APPLICATION OF THE ANTINOMY 
We now have enough of a sketch of the Fregean semantics for quantification on 
the table in order to see why it too is subject to a variant antinomy of the 
variable. In particular, recall the syntactic derivation of (1*) ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’   on the 
Fregean approach. An expression with two gaps, namely ‘( ) ≤ ( )’, which is a 
dyadic predicate.40 A single name, such as ‘7’ may saturate both these gaps, 
resulting in a sentence, ‘7 ≤ 7’. Then both occurrences of this name may be 
removed from the sentence to yield a monadic predicate ‘( ) ≤ ( )’, which is 
inserted as an argument into the quantifier ‘∀𝑥 … 𝑥 …’, which takes only monadic 
predicates. 
 
The problem is immediately apparent. Nothing in the expressions distinguishes 
the dyadic predicate ‘( ) ≤ ( )’ from the monadic predicate ‘( ) ≤ ( )’, which results 
from removing two occurrences of ‘7’ from ‘7 ≤ 7’. This is the source of Russell’s 
objection, which he frames in terms of function-names. 
Frege wishes to have the empty places where the argument is to be 
inserted indicated in some way; thus he says that in 2𝑥3 + 𝑥 the function 
is 2( )3 + ( ). But here his requirement that the two empty places are to be 
filled by the same letter cannot be indicated: there is no way of 
distinguishing what we mean from the function involved in 2𝑥3 + 𝑦.41  
 
The worry is that if Frege were to introduce marks capable of typographically 
distinguishing between these predicates, then that mark would need its own 
semantic significance, which in this context means designation.42  
 
The problem with conceiving of predicates as expressions with gaps is that 
nothing distinguishes between an expression with one gap and one with two 
gaps. On Frege’s view, gaps are to be conceived of as omissions of names from 
sentences.  In the dyadic predicate ‘( ) ≤ ( )’, the two gaps must be capable of 
                                                        
40 This dyadic predicate is required to form sentences such as ‘7≤12’. The discussion in this 
section is modeled on Frege’s 1893, op. cit., §29 syntactic derivation of ‘∀𝑥 𝑥 = 𝑥’. 
41 Russell 1903, op. cit., §482. 
42 Frege 1893, op. cit., §1 introduces the Greek letters ‘’ and ‘’ to mark the argument places of 
functions. However, he is clear that these are not part of the official symbolism, but occur only in 
“elucidations”. See especially ibid., footnote 10. 
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being saturated by different proper names. Thus they must have different 
semantic import. Yet, there is literally nothing corresponding to either gap. 
There is no sense to be made of the gaps being the same or different. Both gaps 
are merely gaps, there remains no constituent capable of delivering the requisite 
difference in semantic import. Thus, the antinomy of the variable has been 
syntacticized.  
 
Of course, we don’t take these considerations alone to have refuted the Fregean 
approach.43 But they do provide sufficient reason to take variables seriously as 
linguistic units. Indeed, contemporary semanticists, though they take inspiration 
from Frege, do not follow him in rejecting assumption ().44 
 
III. TARSKI AND THE ANTINOMY 
There is good reason to admit variables as constituents of quantified and open 
sentences. As Tarski showed, quantifiers operate on sentences just as do 
conjunction and negation. Importantly, they can attach to formulae with 
arbitrary numbers of free-variables. For this reason, Tarski built a syntax in 
which variables occur in the same positions as proper names.  
 
III.I. TARSKI’S SEMANTICS  
 The language he considered includes a set of variables and n-ary predicates. 45 
 
 Variables:  𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, … 
    
Predicates:  𝐹𝑛, 𝐺𝑛, 𝐻𝑛, … 
 
Variables combine with predicates to form open sentences. These can be 
combined with further operators to form more complex sentences. 
 
                                                        
43 For further criticism of the Fregean syntax, see Bryan Pickel, “Syntax in Basic Laws  §§29-32”, 
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, LI, 2 (2010): 253-277. 
44 See, e.g., Montague, op. cit., (p. 250, category BT and p. 258, clause 2) and Heim and Kratzer, op. 
cit., §5.5.5. 
45 An infinite stock of variables and predicates can be specified by priming: 𝑥′, 𝑥′′, …, etc. After 
this initial presentation, we will allow context to determine the adicity of a predicate rather than 
by explicit indexing. 
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Formation rules: 
 If 𝜋 is an n-ary predicate and 𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛 are variables, then 𝜋𝛼1 … 𝛼𝑛  
is a formula. 
 
 If 𝜙 and 𝜓 are formulae and 𝛼 is a variable, then 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓, , ∀𝛼𝜙, 
and ∃𝛼𝜙 are formulae. 
 
In contrast to Frege’s semantics, quantified sentences result from embedding an 
open sentence under a quantifier just as they appear to. Tarski’s semantics 
thereby validates assumption () in the above argument for the antinomy: 
variables are genuine constituents of sentences that contain them, occurring in 
exactly the same positions as proper names. 
 
Tarski’s semantics rests on two related insights. One is that only some 
expressions receive absolute interpretations (relative to a model), while others 
require something additional, a sequence of individuals, to be interpreted.46 The 
other insight is that truth is displaced as the central notion of semantic theory in 
favor of satisfaction by a sequence, represented by the function ⟦ … ⟧𝜎 .47 
 
To explain the notion of satisfaction Tarski (1935, op. cit.) begins with the notion 
of satisfaction by an object. An open sentence with one variable ‘x’ may be true or 
false relative to different assignments to ‘x’. Thus, ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ may be true or false 
relative to each  number, depending on whether the number is less than or equal 
to itself. 
                                                        
46 Since this paper only concerns truth and not logical consequence we could in principle provide 
a fully absolute interpretation that does not relativize to a model.  The semantics of Tarski 1935, 
op. cit., is absolute in this way, but in later work such as Tarski and Vaught’s 1956 paper the 
semantics is model-relative in the way we outline below. See Alfred Tarski and Robert Vaught, 
“Arithmetical extensions of relational systems”, Compositio mathematica, XIII, (1956): 81-102. 
47 One often hears the remark that Tarski's semantics for first-order logic—in particular the 
treatment of variable-binding operators—isn’t compositional (see, e.g., Scott Soames, “True at,” 
Analysis 71, 1 (2011): 124–133). Apparently, Tarksi himself made this remark to Barbara Partee 
(see Wilfrid Hodges, “Tarski's truth definitions,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 2013: § 2.1). But the semantics can easily be made compositional, 
if the semantic value of a variable is a function from sequences to individuals and the semantic 
value of a formula is a function from sequences to truth-values. See Brian Rabern, “Monsters in 
Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives”, Philosophical Studies, CLXIV, 2 (2013): 393-404; and Theo 
Janssen, “Compositionality”, in J. van Benthem and A. ter Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and 
Language, (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997): § 2.4. 
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Satisfaction becomes more complicated for formulae with multiple variables. 
Consider ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑦’. An assignment of 3 to ‘x’ and 7 to ‘y’ satisfies this formula, but 
the converse assignment does not satisfy this formula. In general, a formula may 
have an indefinite number of free variables. If a formula contains n free variables, 
one must speak of the formula as satisfied or not by n-ary sequences of objects.  
 
Further generalizing, Tarski (ibid., p. 191) speaks of an “enumeration” of all the 
variables of the language 〈𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛, … 〉 .The variables in this enumeration may 
be jointly assigned to different sequences of objects. Let the set of these 
sequences of objects be as follows. 
 
‡ 〈𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛, … 〉 ‡  = {〈𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑛, … 〉: 𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑛 ∈ 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑘 = 𝛼𝑗 → 𝑑𝑘 = 𝑑𝑗  } 
  
This presentation slightly differs from Tarski’s since we allow a variable to occur 
multiple times in an enumeration. The objects in the corresponding positions of 
the sequences that serve as values for the enumeration, however, must be 
identical.  
 
One can then define the satisfaction of an atomic open sentence such as ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ 
by a sequence 𝜎 = 〈3, 7, 3, 9, … 〉 in terms of whether the entities in the sequence 
(in positions corresponding to the variables in the enumeration) are in the 
extension of the predicate ‘≤’.  The recursive semantic clauses can be specified 
relative to a model ℳ = 〈𝐷, 𝐼〉, where D is a domain of individuals and I is an 
interpretation function (which maps an n-ary predicate to a set of n-tuples 
drawn from D) as follows: 
 
 Variables:   If 𝛼 is a variable, then 
 ⟦α⟧𝜎 = 𝜎(𝛼) 
Sentences:  If  is an n-ary predicate and 𝛼1, … 𝛼𝑛 are variables, then 
 ⟦ 𝜋𝛼1 … 𝛼𝑛⟧
𝜎 = 1  iff 〈⟦𝛼1⟧
𝜎 , … , ⟦𝛼𝑛⟧
𝜎〉 ∈ 𝐼(𝜋) 
If 𝜙 and 𝜓 are formulae and 𝛼 is a variable, then 
 ⟦𝜙 ∧ 𝜓⟧𝜎 = 1  iff ⟦𝜙⟧𝜎 = 1 and ⟦𝜓⟧𝜎 = 1 
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 ⟦¬𝜙⟧𝜎 = 1  iff ⟦𝜙⟧𝜎 ≠ 1  
 ⟦∀𝛼𝜙⟧𝜎 = 1  iff  for every 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, ⟦𝜙⟧𝜎[𝛼/𝑑] = 1 
 ⟦∃𝛼𝜙⟧𝜎 = 1  iff  for some 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, ⟦𝜙⟧𝜎[𝛼/𝑑] = 1 
 
For any sequence 𝜎, variable 𝛼, and 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, let 𝜎(𝛼) = 𝑑 iff 𝜎𝑗 = 𝑑  and 𝛼 is the jth  
position of the enumeration 〈𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛 … 〉. To define 𝛼-variant sequences let  
𝜎[𝛼/d] be the sequence 𝜏 ∈ ‡ 〈𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛, … 〉 ‡   varying from 𝜎  at most such that 
𝜏(𝛼) = 𝑑. 
 
Some of Tarski’s remarks might suggest that he avoids the antinomy because he 
holds that “variables do not possess any meaning by themselves” by which he 
means that, if variables had referents, then these referents would be “entities of 
such a kind we do not find in our world at all”.48 In particular, they do not refer to 
objects. Variables function in a more complicated way. They designate different 
individuals relative to different sequences. But, there is no absolute designation of 
the variable without supplementation by a sequence. 
  
III.II. DOES TARSKI ESCAPE THE ANTINOMY? 
Tarski has avoided positing referents or designata of the variables. But the 
antinomy concerns the “meaning” of variables more generally: do variables 
agree in meaning? In Fine’s vocabulary, this is equivalent to asking whether they 
have the same semantic role.  In our reconstruction, this is equivalent to asking 
whether alphabetic variants express the same structured contents. This question 
may be posed without supposing that a variable refers. Fine formulates an 
objection to Tarski’s semantics, taking as a premise only that the semantic roles 
of ‘x’ and ‘y’ can be compared for same-ness or difference.  
 
Yet, Tarski’s semantics doesn’t directly speak to the “roles” or “meanings” of ‘x’ 
and ‘y’. It merely assigns values to these variables relative to sequences. That is, 
Tarski offers a semantic theory that assigns designata to variables relative to 
sequences. So although Tarski has avoided assigning absolute referents to 
                                                        
48 Tarski 1941, op. cit., p. 4. Specifically, Tarski says that a numerical variable would have to 
denote a variable number, which is neither positive, nor negative, nor zero. 
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variables, his account leaves open what they “mean”. The crucial task then, is to 
extract a meaning of the variable from Tarski’s semantic theory which fulfills the 
desiderata above: distinct variables in the same sentence contribute differently 
to the sentence’s structured meaning but corresponding variables in alphabetic 
variants make the same contribution. 
 
Fine sees only two options. The first option is that the meaning of a variable is 
the range of values assigned to it by various sequences. That is, the meaning of ‘x’ 
is the class {𝑑: ∃𝜎⟦𝑥⟧𝜎 =  𝑑}, the domain of the variable. Analogously, the 
meaning of ‘y’ is the class {𝑑: ∃𝜎⟦𝑦⟧𝜎 =  𝑑}. The domains of ‘x’ and ‘y’ are the 
same, thus, Tarski can secure a sense in which ‘x’ and ‘y’ agree in semantic role. 
 
Yet, Fine rejects this account on the grounds that it doesn’t account for the 
difference between ‘x’ and ‘y’.49 As we saw before, substituting an occurrence of 
‘x’ for an occurrence of ‘y’ in a formula may result in a new formula with different 
satisfaction conditions. So merely assigning a domain to the variables does not 
capture their full semantic behavior.50  
 
Put in terms of structured meanings, treating the semantic contribution of a 
variable as its domain would force us to identify the structured meanings of 
sentences that should remain distinct.  This argument requires an assumption, 
which we will call structure intrinsicalism. 
 
Structure Intrinsicalism:  If two sentences have the same syntactic structure and  
       the corresponding terminal constituents of these    
       sentences all agree in meaning, then the sentences agree  
       in meaning.  
 
                                                        
49 Fine 2007, op. cit., p. 10. Strictly speaking, Fine objects that Tarski doesn’t secure a semantic 
difference between pairs of variables ‘x’, ‘x’ and ‘y’, ‘x’. This charge is a bit hard to interpret within 
the Tarskian framework, since Tarski’s theory offers no instruction for semantically evaluating 
pairs of variables. 
50 This echoes Church 1956, op. cit., pp. 9-10 who says: “Involved in the meaning of a 
variable...are the kinds of meaning which belong to a proper name of the range. But a variable 
must not be identified with a proper name of its range, since there are also differences of 
meaning between the two.” 
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Structure intrinsicalism can be thought of as a manifestation of the principle of 
compositionality. Namely, the semantic values assigned to syntactically 
composite expressions are determined by the semantic values of their 
components and their mode of combination. So if there is a difference between 
structured meanings of two expressions, this must derive ultimately from a 
difference in structure or a difference in semantic values assigned to terminal 
nodes. We will revisit this assumption when we discuss Fine’s own semantics. 
 
Now consider the sentences ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’. These sentences are 
not synonymous and so should have different structured meanings. But if the 
relevant meaning assigned to a variable is its domain, then these two formulas 
are syntactically isomorphic and their corresponding terminal nodes all agree in 
meaning. As a result, the formulas themselves agree in structured meanings. If 
‘∃’, ‘∀’, and ‘≤’ respectively contribute [∃], [∀], and [≤]  to the structured 
meanings of sentences that contain them, while variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ contribute 
their domain 𝐷, then the common structured meaning of ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and 
‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ can be presented as follows: 
 
This identity of meaning is obviously unwanted. 
 
Fine offers another suggestion for extracting the meaning of a variable from 
Tarski’s framework. He suggests—in essence—looking at the contribution that a 
variable makes to formulae that contain it. In particular, the variable contributes 
an object relative to any input sequence. So the meaning of the variable could be 
construed as just this procedure for taking an input sequence and yielding an 
object that is the “value” of the variable. This procedure determines a function 
taking any sequence to the value of the variable relative to that sequence: 
𝜆𝜎 𝜎(𝑥). One could frame the semantic theory as assigning this function to a 
variable as its absolute or sequence-invariant meaning: ⟦𝑥⟧ = 𝜆𝜎 𝜎(𝑥). This 
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function is what we might call its “semantic value”, since it is sufficient to 
account for the full compositional behavior of a variable. 
 
Fine however, objects that this construal leaves Tarski “unable to account for the 
fact that the semantic role of the variables x and y is the same in the cross-
contextual case[.]”51 Since distinct variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ have distinct semantic 
values, i.e. 𝜆𝜎 𝜎(𝑥) ≠ 𝜆𝜎 𝜎(𝑦), the structured meaning approach discussed above 
will assign different structured meanings to ‘∀𝑥𝐹𝑥’ and ‘∀𝑦𝐹𝑦’. But this violates 
the desideratum that alphabetic variants should have the same structured 
meanings. 
 
Nonetheless, one obvious thought is that the semantic role of a variable 
somehow combines both these aspects. The variable possesses a semantic value, 
and this distinguishes its meaning from other variables. Yet this semantic value 
determines a domain, which is common among many variables. Fine (ibid.) 
reasons that this in unsatisfactory:  “What we have at best is a partial identity of 
semantic role, in that the range of the two variables is the same. But this is 
something that holds equally of the cross-contextual and intra-contextual cases.” 
Even though the diverse semantic values of ‘x’ and ‘y’ determine that they have a 
common feature—their domain—it nevertheless remains that these values are 
distinct. 
 
Framed in terms of structured meanings the problem is clear: Either the 
variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ will contribute something different to the structured 
meanings of sentences that contain them or they will not. If they contribute the 
same thing—say, their domains or gaps or what have you, then the account will 
over-generate synonyms.  If the variables contribute something different—say, 
themselves or numbers or their semantic values, then the account will 
distinguish the structured meanings of alphabetic variants. Neither result is 
desirable. Thus, it seems that the Tarskian approach to variables and 
quantification cannot meet the challenge posed by the antinomy. 
 
                                                        
51 Fine 2007, op. cit., p. 11. 
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IV. FINE’S ANTI-INTRINSICALISM 
Fine takes this to motivate a radical solution to the antinomy that involves 
distinguishing a variable’s intrinsic from its extrinsic semantic features. On this 
view, the meaning of a variable in isolation cannot explain its semantic behavior. 
Fine’s semantics is informally glossed for a small fragment of the language. We 
briefly develop its central aspects. 
 
Fine’s crucial move to avoid the antimony involves denying the plausible 
principle of intrinsicalism, the doctrine that the semantic behavior of a variable 
derives from its semantic role, understood as a semantic characterization of that 
variable in isolation from other expressions.  Indeed, even Fine says this 
principle is “hard to dispute” (ibid., p. 23). His motivation for abandoning it is 
solely to resolve the antimony. 
 
IV.I. FINE’S SEMANTICS 
Fine proposes to semantically evaluate a sentence or complex expression in 
terms of what values its parts may assume when taken in sequence. Thus, Fine 
would evaluate the sentence ‘𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑦 + 𝑥’ for truth or falsity in terms of what 
values the expressions composing the sequence 〈𝑥, +, 𝑦, =, 𝑦, +, 𝑥〉 may assume 
when taken in that sequence.  
 
Fine’s idea is that “distinct variables take values independently of one another 
and that identical variables take the same value”.52 In our example, the sequence 
〈𝑥, +, 𝑦, =, 𝑦, +, 𝑥〉 may assume the value 〈7, +, 3, =, 3, +,7〉, but not the value 
〈7, +, 3, =, 5, +,5〉. Fine calls the set of values that a sequence of expressions can 
assume the semantic connection of that sequence, “[t]he aim of relational 
semantics...is to assign a semantic connection to each sequence of expressions”.53 
 
We will use ‘‡ ⋯ ‡’ to denote the function that takes a sequence of expressions to 
its semantic connection, the range of values that the constituent expressions are 
                                                        
52 Ibid., p. 27. 
53 Ibid., p.  25. 
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capable of taking in that sequence.  A sequence consisting of a single variable 𝛼 is 
assigned to its domain, D. 
 
1-Membered Sequences:  
‡ 〈𝛼〉 ‡ = {𝑑: 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷} 
 
The semantic connection on an n-tuple of variables is meant to generalize the 
notion of a domain for a variable; it is “the set of sequences of values that the 
[variables] are simultaneously capable of assuming”.54 
 
2-Membered Sequences: 
‡ 〈𝛼1, 𝛼2〉 ‡ = {〈𝑑1, 𝑑2〉: 𝑑1, 𝑑2 ∈ 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 → 𝑑1 = 𝑑2 } 
 
n-Membered Sequences:  
‡ 〈𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛〉 ‡ = {〈𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑛〉: 𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑛 ∈ 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑘 = 𝛼𝑗 → 𝑑𝑘 = 𝑑𝑗  } 
 
Since variables are the only elements that are coordinated in semantic 
connections, it will suffice to focus on them. 
 
Fine’s semantics derives the truth conditions of a formula 𝜙 from the semantic 
connection on its expansion, which enumerates the primitive constituents of 𝜙. 
So the truth conditions of 𝜙 will be specified as a function of the semantic 
connection on its expansion. It is worth noting that the recursive procedures are 
deeply non-compositional. This is partially because the sub-formulae will be 
evaluated relative to the semantic connection of the whole. But also, the 
procedure for evaluating a formula consisting of an operator and two sub-
formulae such ‘(𝜙 ∧ 𝜓)’ in terms of these components will not proceed by 
evaluating each sub-formula in isolation, but in terms of its consequences for the 
whole.55  
                                                        
54 Ibid., p.  27. 
55 As a result, Fine’s semantics requires a further twist in order to accommodate the semantics of 
variable binding: a coordination relation among variables. Though this aspect of Fine’s 
semantics—the coordination scheme—has received the most attention, it ultimately plays little 
role in the resolution of the antinomy (see Bryan Pickel and Brian Rabern, “Does semantic 
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IV.II. FINE’S ATTEMPTED RESOLUTION 
We can now ask Fine the question he puts to Tarski: what account, within the 
framework of the Finean semantics, can be given of the semantic role of the 
variables? At first pass, Fine’s semantics, like Tarski’s, doesn’t assign any 
semantic role to the variables. Fine’s semantics doesn’t traffic in “roles”, but 
merely offers a list of sentences characterizing how a variable ‘x’ contributes to 
the semantic connection of an arbitrary sequence: ‡ 〈𝑥〉 ‡ = {𝑎: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐷}; ‡ 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 ‡
 = {〈𝑎, 𝑏〉: 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐷}; ‡ 〈𝑥, 𝑥〉 ‡ = {〈𝑎, 𝑎〉: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐷}; and so on. This leaves open the 
question of how to extract semantic roles from Fine’s semantics. 
 
Fine suggests that the semantic role of a variable, ‘x’, is just the semantic 
connection on the sequence consisting of just that variable, ‡ 〈𝑥〉 ‡ = {𝑎: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐷}. 
Since  ‡ 〈𝑥〉 ‡ = {𝑎: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐷} = ‡ 〈𝑦〉 ‡, ‘x’ and ‘y’ have the same semantic roles. 
 
But this does not explain the difference in behavior between ‘x’ and ‘y’, since 
from their respective semantic roles one cannot derive that  ‡ 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 ‡  is 
{〈𝑎, 𝑏〉: 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐷} while ‡ 〈𝑥, 𝑥〉 ‡ is {< 𝑎, 𝑎 >: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐷}, which is different. Thus, the 
semantic connections on pairs of variables are not determined by the semantic 
connections on those variables taken in isolation. 
 
Fine thinks this is as it should be. The semantic connections on 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 and 〈𝑥, 𝑥〉 
are primitive facts about these sequences. To insist on deriving claims about the 
semantic role of a pair of variables from the semantic roles of the variables 
themselves, Fine thinks, is to insist on the intrinsicalist doctrine, that there is “no 
difference in semantic relationship without a difference in semantic feature”.56 
According to Fine, the behavior of a variable in a sequence of expressions is an 
extrinsic feature of that variable. And the extrinsic features of variables need not 
derive from the semantic roles of the variables themselves. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
relationism solve Frege’s puzzle?,” (manuscript) for discussion of the coordination schema with 
an explicit formalization of Fine’s relational semantics for first-order logic).  
56 Fine 2007, op. cit., p. 24. 
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Fine insists that “in asserting that the semantic role of x and y is the same, we 
only wish to assert that their intrinsic semantic features are the same” (ibid., p.  
22). The difference in semantic roles between the pairs 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 and 〈𝑥, 𝑥〉 are 
intrinsic features of these pairs, but extrinsic features of the variables 
themselves. Thus, Fine believes he has secured the difference in semantic role 
between these sequences. As he says, 
[The relational semantics] embodies a solution to the antinomy: the 
intrinsic semantic features of x and y (as given by the degenerate 
semantic connections on those variables) are the same, though the 
intrinsic semantic features of the pairs x, y and x, x (again, as given by the 
semantic connections on those pairs) are different.57 
 
This is Fine’s attempted resolution of the antinomy.58 
 
We have re-interpreted Fine’s requirement that two variables have the same 
semantic role as the claim that sentences that are alphabetic variants should 
have the same structured meanings. Fine can achieve this, since he can think that 
a variable contributes its domain to the structured meaning of a sentence that 
contains it. Of course, this move mimics the first option that Fine offers Tarski, 
according to which the semantic role of a variable is its domain. The difficulty for 
Tarski, recall, was that this proposal identifies the structured meanings of 
sentences such as ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ since these sentences have the 
same structure and their terminal nodes have the same “meanings”. 
 
                                                        
57 Ibid., pp. 31-2. 
58 King 2007, op. cit., pp. 218-222 also abandons intrinsicalism, since he thinks that ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
contribute the same “thing” to structured contents, namely nothing, while ‘Fxy’ and ‘Fxx’ 
nevertheless express different structured contents. In “A theory of bondage”, Salmon (see p. 121, 
footnote 14) likewise gives up intrinsicalism by assigning a semantic role to an occurrence of ‘x’ 
in isolation that cannot be used to predict the behavior of ‘x’ in other contexts (Nathan Salmon, “A 
theory of bondage”, in Content, Cognition, and Communication, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007): 113-141). Salmon’s approach makes use of complicated type-shifting rules, which he 
assimilates to Frege’s “indirect reference”. Likewise Aleksandar Kellenberg (“The antinomy of the 
variable”, dialectica LXIV, 2 (2010): 225-236) seemingly gives up the project of deriving the 
semantic role of a sentence from the semantic roles of the expressions it contains: “...it is a 
mistake to think that the difference in semantic role between ‘x > y’ and ‘x > x’ must be due to a 
difference in semantic role between the pairs of variable types (‘x’, ‘y’) and (‘x’, ‘x’)... Rather, the 
expression types ‘x > y’ and ‘x > x’ have different semantic roles because the former contains 
occurrences of two variable types, whereas the latter contains occurrences of only one variable 
type, although one that occurs twice" (ibid., p. 231).  Yet, Kellenberg maintains that he’s an 
intrinsicalist. 
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Fine’s position, however, is not susceptible to this criticism since he denies 
intrinsicalism. He denies that the “meaning” of a whole follows from the meaning 
of the parts and their arrangement. So, Fine may say that ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and 
‘ ∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥 ’ have different structured meanings, because they have 
corresponding constituents with different meanings. In particular, ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and 
‘𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ are corresponding constituents of ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’, 
respectively. Fine denies that ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ have the same “meaning”, even 
though their ultimate constituents have the same meaning. (In the following 
structured meanings we explicitly display the semantic connection on an 
expression immediately below the expression’s node in the tree.) 
 
 
On the other hand, Fine may say that all corresponding constituents of alphabetic 
variants such as  ‘∀𝑥𝐹𝑥’ and ‘∀𝑦𝐹𝑦’ agree in meaning: 
 
 
 
Thus, Fine’s denial of intrinsicalism may also be taken as a denial of what we call 
structure intrinsicalism: composite expressions with the same syntactic structure 
may have distinct “meanings” even though their corresponding constituent 
expressions agree in meaning. 
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V. THE TARSKIAN RESOLUTION 
Our puzzle is that ‘x’ cannot be substituted for ‘y’ in ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’, yielding 
‘ ∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥 ’, without change of meaning. Yet, alphabetic variants are 
completely synonymous and so must have the same structured meanings. Fine’s 
resolution to this puzzle involves denying both intrinsicalism and, more 
generally, compositionality. 
 
In order to respect intrinsicalism, the semantic axioms governing variables ‘x’ 
and ‘y’ must assign them to distinct semantic values.  In Tarski’s explicit 
semantics the variables are ordered in a context-invariant way. The semantic 
value of the nth variable in the ordering is a function that takes a sequence to the 
nth position in the sequence. We represent that ordering as a function mapping 
variables into numbers. Let 𝑐 be a function from the set of variables {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, … } to 
the set of natural numbers ℕ. Then Tarski can be viewed as assigning the 
following “meanings” to ‘x’ and ‘y’ given the ordering function c: 
⟦𝑥⟧ = 𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑥) 
⟦𝑦⟧ = 𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑦) 
On this semantics, ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’ are assigned to different objects, since they occupy 
different positions in the ordering and so 𝑐(𝑥) ≠ 𝑐(𝑦). The variables do have 
their domains in common. Yet, as we have seen, the domain is not a suitable 
candidate to secure the semantic sameness between ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’.  
 
In assigning different semantic values to the variables ‘𝑥’ and ‘𝑦’, Tarski—and his 
followers in standard formal semantics—seem unable to account for the fact that 
alphabetic variants are synonymous. Moreover, the context invariant 
enumeration is—as Tarski (1935, op. cit., 191, note 1) himself admits—“purely 
technical”.  Related approaches popular in formal semantics such as Heim and 
Kratzer (op. cit., see §5.3.3) likewise face this difficulty, since they simply 
lexicalize the semantic difference between variables.59  
                                                        
59 Indeed, in her 1982 dissertation Heim proposes to identify the objects playing the roles of 
variables (“discourse referents”) simply with numbers (p. 166): Irene Heim, The Semantics of 
Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, PhD. Dissertation, (University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 
1982). 
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But Tarski is sensitive to these challenges. He suggests that a less stipulative 
enumeration of the variables could be given in terms of the order of the variables 
in a formula. 
[We could number all the variables of every given expression] on the 
basis of the natural order in which they follow one another in the 
expression: the sign standing on the extreme left could be called the first, 
the next the second, and so on. In this way we could again set up a certain 
correlation between the free variables of a given function and the terms of 
the sequence. This correlation…would obviously vary with the form of the 
function in question.60 
 
Tarski is proposing that we replace the stipulative, and pre-established, 
enumeration of the variables—whereby e.g. 𝑥 is associated with the 1st member 
of a sequence and 𝑦 is associated with the 2nd, etc.—with an enumeration c that 
is sensitive to the formula being evaluated. In particular, Tarski proposes that if 
‘𝑥’ is the nth variable in a formula, then ‘𝑥’ will be associated with the nth position 
in a sequence. Tarski’s brief suggestion, we claim, contains the resources needed 
to resolve the antinomy.61 
 
On this proposal, each position in any sentence 𝜙 induces a context 𝑐 which 
associates the variables in 𝜙 with positions in sequences. Namely, the value of 
the variable ‘x’ for an input sequence will be the object in the 𝑐(𝑥)𝑡ℎ position of 
that sequence. If sentences 𝜙 and 𝜙∗ are alphabetic variants and ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
occupy corresponding positions, then ‘x’ and ‘y’ will be associated with positions 
in sequences by 𝑐 and 𝑐∗ so that 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐∗(𝑦) and so 𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑥) = 𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐∗(𝑦). Thus, 
‘x’ in the context induced by its position in the sentence ‘∀𝑥𝐹𝑥’ will have the 
same semantic value as ‘y’ in the context induced by ‘∀𝑦𝐹𝑦’.  
 
                                                        
60 Tarski 1935, op. cit., p. 191, note 1. 
61 The semantic axioms for the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ can now be written as ⟦𝑥⟧ = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑥) and 
⟦𝑦⟧ = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑦). This has an interesting pay-off. Although according to the semantics ⟦𝑥⟧ ≠ ⟦𝑦⟧, 
it nonetheless assigns them a common semantic property, namely 𝜆𝛼 (⟦𝛼⟧ = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝛼)). If one 
thinks of the “semantic role” of an expression as its “representational function”, then it is natural 
to think of the semantic role of an expression as the property attributed to it by its canonical 
axiom in the semantic theory. It follows that these two semantic axioms deliver the result that ‘x’ 
and ‘y’ have the same semantic roles. 
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Structured meanings should be specified in terms of the context-saturated 
meanings of the variables not in terms of the context-unsaturated meanings. In 
practical terms, this means that if a variable ‘x’ in sentence 𝜙 is to be evaluated at 
context c, then the ‘x’ will contribute its semantic value at c, namely 𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑥).  This 
is analogous to Kaplan’s idea that the belief content of a sentence is given by its 
content (context-saturated meaning) and not its character (context-unsaturated 
meaning), though with a crucial difference, since our discourse contexts evolve 
as the sentence is processed.62 
 
We will provide recursive procedures specifying the truth conditions and the 
structured meaning of each sentence. Given this semantics, alphabetic variants 
will have the same structured meanings. On the other hand, if ‘x’ and ‘y’ occur in a 
single sentence 𝜙, then they will be evaluated at contexts c and c* such that 
𝑐(𝑥) ≠ 𝑐∗(𝑦) and so 𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑥) ≠ 𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐∗(𝑦).  As a result, ‘x’ and ‘y’ will have different 
semantic contents in the contexts induced by their respective positions in 
‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’. As a result, replacing ‘y’ by ‘x’, yielding ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’, will not 
preserve meaning. This, in essence, resolves the antinomy of the variable. 
 
But significant explanatory burdens remain. First, we must explain how to 
evaluate a variable in a context. We must then explain the formal procedure by 
which the context evolves as a sentence is processed. As Fine remarks, the 
appeal to contexts “does not really solve the puzzle but merely pushes it back a 
step.”63 He asks, “why do we say that the variables x and y have a different 
semantic role in” ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ (ibid.)? Our answer is that the difference in 
meaning of ‘x’ and ‘y’ in ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ can be explained by a theory describing the 
evolution of the enumeration in a sentence. This same theory will predict that 
                                                        
62 Kaplan 1989, op. cit., proposes two layers of meaning for an expression, the character and the 
content. These two layers of meaning play different roles in Kaplan’s semantic theory: the 
content is the information asserted in a particular context, whereas, the character of an 
expression encodes what content the expressions would have in any context. If in context c, A 
says to B ‘I am hungry’ and, in c*, B says to A ‘You are hungry’, then they have said the same thing 
relative to their respective contexts. We likewise propose two layers of meaning, one captures 
how the value of a variable depends on the discourse context, and the other captures the 
information value of the variable relative to a discourse context. Variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ have 
different context-unsaturated meanings, but in the context of alphabetic variants, such as ∀𝑥𝐹𝑥 
and ∀𝑦𝐹𝑦, their “content” is the same. 
63 Fine 2007, op. cit., p. 8. 
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corresponding variables in alphabetic variants have the same meaning in their 
respective contexts. 
 
V.I THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEXT 
In order to implement Tarski’s idea compositionally, we assess a variable against 
a sequence of individuals 𝜎, and also a discourse context c, which enumerates the 
variables. 
⟦𝑥⟧ = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑥) 
⟦𝑦⟧ = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝑦) 
Following Tarski we assume that each sequence of individuals 𝜎 is of infinite 
length.64 Effectively a sequence 𝜎 maps numbers onto objects in the domain. In 
Tarksi’s semantics every variable has a value relative to a sequence because 
Tarski stipulates an initial, static mapping c from variables to numbers. The 
value of a variable ‘x’ relative to a sequence 𝜎 and the stipulated enumeration c is 
𝜎𝑐(𝑥). 
 
By way of contrast in our semantics the initial discourse context c—the initial 
mapping from variables to numbers—does not associate any variables with 
numbers. There is no pre-established ordering of the variables. Rather the 
enumeration is determined dynamically as a sentence is processed—newly 
introduced variables are associated with new positions in sequences. 65  The 
relevant context will be supplied by the variable’s position in the sentence (as we 
explain below). Collectively, the discourse context and the sequence define an 
assignment function on the variables in the sentence.66 
  
                                                        
64 Tarski 1935, op. cit., p. 195, note 1 also considers the possibility of employing finite sequences.  
Dekker (1994) develops the idea in a different direction more in line with the proposal in the 
text. A formula is initially evaluated against a finite or null sequence, which grows as quantifiers 
are processed. This idea could easily be integrated into the proposal of the text. 
65  Our approach integrates ideas from Heim’s 1982, op. cit., file-change semantics and 
Vermeulen’s model of variables as stacks: C.F.M. Vermeulen, “Variables as stacks”, Journal of 
Logic, Language and Information IX, 2 (2000): 143–167. This strategy is also hinted at in Bryan 
Pickel, “Variables and attitudes”, Noûs XLIX, 2: 333–356, §5.3. 
66 Strictly speaking, c, will be a relation, not a function, since a context might evolve by adding 
multiple indices to ‘x’, e.g. {〈𝑥, 1〉, 〈𝑥, 2〉}, as in the formula ‘∃𝑥∃𝑥𝐹𝑥’. But since it is only the highest 
index that will matter we now define 𝑐(𝛼) as the highest n such that there is a variable 𝛼 and 
〈𝛼, 𝑛〉 ∈ 𝑐.  
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We can then assign a structured meaning to a sentence by assessing the semantic 
values of its constituents at the context induced by their position in the sentence. 
 
On the resulting semantic theory, the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ contribute functions 
from sequences into objects to the structured meanings of sentences that contain 
them. These functions are in no way typographic. They lie purely on the “non-
conventional side” of language.67 
 
How are variables introduced into discourse? Since we focus on the semantics of 
first-order logic, we assume that they are introduced by quantifiers. A quantifier 
‘∃𝑥’ attached to a formula 𝜙 is processed first by updating the context so that ‘x’ 
is assigned to a new position in the sequence and then by evaluating 𝜙 with 
respect to this new context.  
 
In our model, we need to keep track of the highest number assigned to a variable 
in discourse context c. Represent this by 𝑁𝑢𝑚(𝑐) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥({𝑛: ∃𝛼 〈𝛼, 𝑛〉 ∈ 𝑐}). The 
basic idea, then, is that one evaluates a quantified formula ∃𝑥𝜙 relative to c by 
evaluating its sub-formula, 𝜙, relative to the extension of c that assigns ‘x’ to the 
next position in a sequence, to 𝑁𝑢𝑚(𝑐) + 1.  
 
                                                        
67 Cf. Fine 2007, op. cit., p. 11. There may be a residual worry about absolute or context-
unsaturated semantic value of the variable. In particular, contexts are modeled as functions from 
variables into the natural numbers, representing positions in sequences. So the domain of this 
function may include linguistic items. The worry is that the very appeal to such functions makes 
the semantics objectionably typographic on the grounds that it has to “incorporate the variables 
themselves […] into the very identity of” their semantic values (ibid., 32). We find this worry 
misguided. We don’t see how the appeal to such a set could be objectionably typographic. There 
is nothing objectionable about the claim that the semantic role of a predicate is to map entities to 
truth-values. But many predicates will map themselves to a truth-value (e.g. ‘is a predicate’). For 
us, a context is just a set, that may include ordered pairs of variables and numbers. Perhaps the 
worry is that the set will have the variables themselves in its transitive closure. But this will also 
be true of the extensions of many predicates.  
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Variables: If 𝛼 is a variable, then 
 ⟦𝛼⟧ = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝜎 𝜎𝑐(𝛼) 
Sentences:  If 𝜋 is an n-ary predicate and 𝛼1, … 𝛼𝑛 are variables, then 
 ⟦𝜋𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛⟧
𝑐,𝜎 = 1   iff 〈⟦𝛼1⟧(𝑐, 𝜎), … , ⟦𝛼𝑛⟧(𝑐, 𝜎)〉 ∈ 𝐼(𝜋) 
If 𝜙 and 𝜓 are formulae and 𝛼 is a variable, then 
 ⟦¬𝜙⟧𝑐,𝜎 = 1   iff ⟦𝜙⟧𝑐,𝜎 ≠ 1 
 ⟦𝜙 ∧ 𝜓⟧𝑐,𝜎 = 1   iff ⟦𝜙⟧𝑐,𝜎 = 1 and ⟦𝜓⟧𝑐,𝜎 = 1 
 ⟦∀𝛼𝜙⟧𝑐,𝜎 = 1   iff for all 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, ⟦𝜙⟧𝑐
∗,𝜎[𝑐∗(𝛼)/𝑑] = 1,  
where 𝑐∗ = 𝑐 ∪ {〈𝛼, 𝑁𝑢𝑚(𝑐) + 1〉} 
 
 ⟦∃𝛼𝜙⟧𝑐,𝜎 = 1   iff for some 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, ⟦𝜙⟧𝑐
∗,𝜎[𝑐∗(𝛼)/𝑑] = 1,  
where 𝑐∗ = 𝑐 ∪ {〈𝛼, 𝑁𝑢𝑚(𝑐) + 1〉} 
 
On our semantics, a formula is evaluated against two parameters, a discourse 
context c and a sequence of individuals 𝜎. We can think of the closed formulae of 
our language as regimenting sentences of natural language. As Tarski observed in 
defining truth relative to satisfaction only, if a closed formula is satisfied by one 
sequence, then it will be satisfied by any sequence. This led him to define truth 
for a sentence in terms of satisfaction by every sequence. We similarly observe 
that, for a closed formula 𝜙 and context c, if ⟦𝜙⟧(𝑐, 𝜎) = 1, then ⟦𝜙⟧(𝑐∗, 𝜎) = 1 
for any 𝑐∗. This leads us to a slightly different definition of truth simpliciter than 
might be offered on the Tarskian model. For us, a sentence 𝜙 will be true 
simpliciter if ⟦𝜙⟧(𝑐, 𝜎) = 1 for the empty discourse context 𝑐 = ∅ and every 
sequence 𝜎. In particular, we find it more natural to think of a sentence as 
evaluated at an empty discourse context, which evolves as the formula is 
processed.68  
 
Unlike Fine’s semantics, this semantics is strongly compositional insofar as if 
⟦𝛼⟧ = ⟦𝛽⟧ and 𝜙𝛼 differs from 𝜙𝛽 only in that 𝛼 is substituted for 𝛽, then ⟦𝜙𝛼⟧ =
⟦𝜙𝛽⟧.  The only plausible candidates for failures of substitution—and the only 
expressions sensitive to the dynamic enumeration—are variables. But for any 
                                                        
68 We do not mean to foreclose the possibility of treating open formulae as representing 
sentences of natural language as well, such as those containing demonstrative or anaphoric 
pronouns. Doing so, of course, would require that truth be identified with satisfaction, not by 
every sequence, but by some contextually salient sequence or sequences. 
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variables 𝛼 and 𝛽, if ⟦𝛼⟧ = ⟦𝛽⟧, then 𝛼 = 𝛽. This just reflects the fact that the 
context-invariant semantic values of any two variables differ.69 
 
Nonetheless, the semantic value of distinct variables 𝛼 and 𝛽 may nonetheless 
coincide in their appropriate respective discourse contexts. In particular, the 
variable ‘x’ in ‘∀𝑥𝐹𝑥’ has the same context saturated meaning as ‘y’ in ‘∀𝑦𝐹𝑦’. In 
evaluating each sentence relative to the null context, one must evaluate the sub-
formulas ‘𝐹𝑥’ and ‘𝐹𝑦’ relative to an updated context in each case. One evaluates 
‘𝐹𝑥’ in an updated context c* such that 𝑐∗(𝑥) = 1. Similarly, one evaluates ‘𝐹𝑦’ in 
an updated context c** such that 𝑐∗∗(𝑦) = 1.  Thus, both variables have the same 
meanings in context: ⟦𝑥⟧(𝑐∗) = ⟦𝑦⟧(𝑐∗∗) = 𝜆𝜎 𝜎1. We will use the meanings in 
contexts to define structured meanings. On the other hand, consider the 
variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ in the open sentence ‘𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ embedded in  ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’. 
These variables will be assessed relative to a single context c such that 𝑐(𝑥) = 1 
and 𝑐(𝑦) = 2. As a result, ‘x’ and ‘y’ will have different context sensitive meanings 
in this sentence: namely ⟦𝑥⟧(𝑐) = 𝜆𝜎 𝜎1 ≠ ⟦𝑦⟧(𝑐) = 𝜆𝜎 𝜎2. 
 
V.II STRUCTURED MEANINGS 
We have now given a truth conditional semantics. We now show how the 
structured meanings for formulae can be read off the semantic values of their 
constituents in contexts. We recursively assign structured meanings to every 
sentence 𝜙 of the first-order language at any context c, written [𝜙]𝑐 . (Let 
𝑁𝑢𝑚(𝑐)  =  𝑀𝑎𝑥({𝑛 ∶  ∃𝛽 ⟨𝛽, 𝑛⟩  ∈  𝑐}). And, let 𝑐 +  𝛼 =  𝑐 ∪ {⟨𝛼, 𝑁𝑢𝑚(𝑐) + 1⟩}. 
For any logical connective 𝛾 ∈  {¬,∧, ∀, ∃} let its contribution [𝛾] be its semantic 
value.) 
                                                        
69 Some ways of construing compositionality are more demanding. They might require for 
instance that every expression is provided a semantic value, and that the semantic value of every 
complex expression is determined by the semantic values of its immediate constituents and their 
mode of combination. The semantics offered here is syncategorematic in the case of sentential 
connectives, since we haven’t assigned them semantic values in isolation but have only provided 
truth-conditions for constructions that contain them. But we could easily extract a non-
syncategorematic semantics for instance the semantic value of the existential quantifier can be 
provided as follows: ⟦∃𝛼⟧ =  𝜆𝑝. 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝜎. ∃𝑑 𝑝(𝑐∗, 𝜎[𝑐∗(𝛼)/𝑑])  = 1 , where 𝑐∗ = 𝑐 ∪ {〈𝛼, 𝑁𝑢𝑚(𝑐) +
1〉}. (In the preceding lexical entry the variables 𝑝, 𝑐, 𝜎, 𝑑 are meant to be of designated semantic 
types as follows: 𝑝 ranges over functions from discourse contexts and sequences of individuals to 
{0,1}; 𝑐 ranges over discourse contexts; 𝜎 ranges over sequences of individuals drawn from the 
domain; and 𝑑 ranges over individuals in the domain 𝐷.) 
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This procedure recursively specifies a structured meaning for every sentence of 
the language of first-order logic in terms of the semantic values of the basic 
constituents of the sentence. 
 
Moreover, the structured meanings are appropriate in that the semantics 
delivers the same structured meanings to pre-theoretically synonymous 
sentences and distinct structured meanings for sentences that are not 
synonymous, in the sense of expressing distinct belief contents. Return to our 
problematic pairs: ‘∀𝑥𝐹𝑥’ and ‘∀𝑦𝐹𝑦’ should have the same structured meanings 
while ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ and ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’ should have distinct structured meanings. 
 
This result is delivered by our semantics. The structured meanings of ‘∀𝑥𝐹𝑥’ and 
‘∀𝑦𝐹𝑦’ will be the same, namely: 
 
In their respective formulas, ‘x’ and ‘y’ are evaluated at contexts that assign them 
to the same function from sequences into objects. 
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On the other hand, the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ in ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ will be associated 
with different functions from sequences to objects. They will thereby make 
different truth conditional contributions, which will figure into the structured 
meaning of this sentence, namely: 
 
As desired, the structured meaning of ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’ is different from the 
structured meaning of ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’, namely: 
 
As a result we have resolved our puzzle.  The variable ‘x’ cannot be substituted 
for ‘y’ in ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑦’, yielding ‘∃𝑦∀𝑥 𝑥 ≤  𝑥’, without change of meaning. Yet, 
alphabetic variants are completely synonymous and so must have the same 
structured meanings. 
 
Finally, our view preserves intrinsicalism in two senses. First, we’ve assigned 
distinct semantic values to distinct variables. These semantic values predict the 
truth conditional contribution of a variable ‘x’ in a sentential context c, namely 
⟦𝑥⟧(𝑐). The truth conditional contribution of the variable in a sentential context 
corresponds to its value in the structured meaning assigned to that sentence. 
Second, the truth conditional contributions of complex expressions and 
sentences in wider contexts—and thus their contributions to the structured 
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meanings of sentences that contain them—are a function of the truth conditional 
contributions of their components in context. It is for this reason that the 
structured meaning of a sentence can be described in terms of the semantic 
contributions of its terminal nodes. We don’t need to assign emergent semantic 
contributions to non-terminal nodes, as do anti-intrinsicalists such as Fine and 
King. Thus, our Tarskian resolution to the antinomy preserves intrinsicalism. 
 
 
BRYAN PICKEL 
 
 BRIAN RABERN 
University of Edinburgh 
